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The Cover
Hsieh-Chai, the mythical Chinese animal
whose bronze sculpture graces our main lobby
and who has become a University of Pennsylvania
Law School symbol and institution, was executed
by famed sculptor Henry Mitchell in 1962.
The Law Alumni journal's tribute to the venerable "goat" and to the arrival of Spring 1979, was
executed with artistic license by Donna E. Nelson,
a Class of 1980 J.D./M.B.A. candidate.
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Dean James 0. Freedman
brings with him to the deanship
an outstanding record of scholarly
achievement, a wide experience of
administration, and deep concern
for the University and the Law
School. His attachment to intellectual values is matched by his
sensitivity to the needs of those
around him; he is a man of vision
and of prudence. With his personal and intellectual qualities, I
believe that Jim Freedman will be
a great dean of our Law School
and, indeed, in the history of Law
deans everywhere.
-Martin Meyerson, President
The University of Pennsylvania

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol14/iss2/1
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Law Alumni Day
Will Be Held On

April 24, 1979
Guest Speaker:
joseph R. Riden, Jr.
U.S. Senator From
Delaware
Supreme Court Clerkships

Two members of the Class of
1978 have been selected as Supreme Court law clerks for the
1979 Term of Court: Richard A.
Friedman is clerk to Chief Justice
Burger and William J. Murphy to
Mr. justice Blackmun.
Alumni Reception to be Held
at Annual ABA Meeting

A cocktail reception for University of Pennsylvania Law Alumni
will be held on Monday, Aug~st
13,1979 at the annual meeting of
the American Bar Association in
Dallas, Texas. Watch your mail for
news of the event.
Moot Court Finalists From Penn

Gregory Berry and Dalton
Phillips, both members of the Law
School Class of 1980, have reached
the finals of the Frederick Douglass Moot Court Competition . The
contenders will be competing at
the end of March in San Fran cisco,
California.
Our Newest Faculty

Professor Alan Watson of the
University of Edinburgh has accepted the invitation of the School
to become Professor of Law,
effective July 1, 1979.

Race and Law: Black Reparations
and the Idea of
Compensatory Justice

A symposium, funded by the
Public Committee for the Humanities in Pennsylvania and conducted
under the auspices of The Law
School, the Black Faculty and Administrators of the University of
Pennsylvania, and the Black Law
Student's Union of the University's
Law School , was held for two days
in February.
The program discussed the
concept of reparations as a means
to remedy the injury many Black
Americans suffered as a result of
both a heritage of slavery and the
continuing effects of racial discrimination and prejudice which remain today. Present at the Symposium were teaching humanists,
legal scholars, community leaders
and a broad spectrum of persons
from the Philadelphia area who
explored the moral, ethical and
public policy implications of the
idea of Black reparations . Participants included Arnold Schuchter,
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an Administrative Assistant to
United States Congressman John
Conyers ; Derrick Bell, Professor of
Law at Harvard Law School ; james
Nickel , Professor of Philosophy at
Witchita State University; Reverend Muhammed Kenyatta of the
Black Theology Project at Haverford College ; Arthur Kinoy, Professor of Law at Rutgers University
and the New York Center for Constitutional Rights ; and Ewart Guinier, Professor of Afro-American
Studies at Harvard University.
On Exhibit

A remarkable exhibit is now
on view in the main rotunda of
the Law School. The display, entitled " Women and Equal Rights"
and organized by Nancy Arnold of
the Bible Law Library, presents a
history of equal rights from Hammurabi to the present day. If one
has the opportunity to visit the
School, either for Law Alumni Day
or otherwise, a concerted effort
should be made to see this extraordinary show.
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Symposium

Professor Noyes Leech congratulates Dean
Freedman
Below: From left to right University
President Martin Meyerson, Dean
Freedman, judge Louis H. Pollak and judge
A. Leon Higgenbotham.

In Celebration of The New Regime

A ceremony and reception
marking the change in command
from former Dean Judge Louis H.
Pollak to Dean James 0. Freedman
was held on February 12 in Room
100 of the Law School.
The stalwarts who either remained at the School or braved
the heavy snowfall forcing the
University's closing, witnessed
Dean Freedman's formal acceptance of the duties of his new office. Presiding was University of
Pennsylvania President Martin
Meyerson, who introduced the
new Dean and guest speakers
Judges A. Leon Higginbotham and
Louis H. Pollack to those assembled, which included U.S. District
Court Judge NormaL. Shapiro,
and members of the Law School
Faculty, Administration and student body.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol14/iss2/1
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The Annual Judges' Reception

The Board of M anagers of the
Law Alumni Society is mindful of
its responsibility to assist students
in making the change from law
student to active practitioner.
Each year, Philadelphia Common Pleas Judge Doris May Harris,
in concert with the Board of Managers of the Society, graciousl y
sponsors the Judges' Reception at
City Hall. This past fall , a sizeable
number of students were afforded
the opportunity to informally meet
with many Municipal and Common Pleas judges and, in addition ,
tour some of the City Hall Court
facilities at the reception 's close.
Two second year students, Vivian Payne
and Gail Wilson, converse with Common
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
2014 Curtis Carson, Jr., and Doris
Pleas judges,

May Harris, at Law Alumni Society's Annual
judges' Reception .
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featured l vent
Cup winner Garrard R. Beeney is greeted
by justice john Paul Stevens.

The Keedy Cup Competition for 1978
justice john Paul Stevens, United States Supreme Court; Judge Louis H. Pollak, United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; and justice Samuel). Silverman, New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, comprised the illustrious Bench which
listened to the 1978 Edwin R. Keedy Cup final argument. Petitioners Thomas F. Connell, '79, and
Margaret A. Seltzer, '79, argued against the winning
respondents, Garrard R. Beeney, '79 and Kenneth
). Warren, '79.
The case upon which this year's competition
was based was Gannett Co., Inc. v . De Pasquale ,
which addresses the issue of whether a trial judge
may bar the press and public from a pre-trial suppression hearing in a widely publicized murder
case.
The judges praised highly the extraordinary
arguments presented by both petitioners and
respondents. Special commendation goes as well
to Professor RalphS. Sprizer, Faculty advisor to the
Moot Court Board.
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A Message from
Law Alumni Society
President David H. Marion, '63
At the last meeting of the Board of Managers
of your Law Alumni Society, the agenda included
for discussion the question of the relationship, if
any, which should exist between the Society and
the Law Alumni Annual Giving campaign.
It was noted that, by a curious process of historical development, the Managers of the Alumni
Society-presumably a leadership group of individuals particularly interested in and dedicated to
the well-being of the Law School-were totally
divorced from the perennial activity by which the
Alumni impact most significantly upon that wellbeing, the annual raising of funds for the Law
School's support.
I suppose it was inevitable in a group of
lawyers that one of our number should inquire
whether proposals under discussion for involvement of the Managers in the Giving campaign were
consistent with the purposes and objectives of the
Law Alumni Society as set forth in the By-Laws of
that organization.
Chris Mooney, our Assistant Dean for Alumni
Affairs, who maintains himself in a constant state of
readiness for such difficult questions, immediately
produced a copy of the By-Laws and confronted
us with an even greater anomaly: nowhere in the
By-Laws is there any statement of purpose or objectives to justify this organization's continued
existence!
Thus was the Board of Man age rs confronted
with a challenge from which, I am proud to report,
your Board did not shrink. Prompt and forthright
action was called for and taken : the President was
unanimously directed to appoint a Special Committee to explore in- depth the purposes and rationale for the Law Alumni Society.
The Special Committee was duly appointed
and convened and, after almost ten minutes of
deep explo rati on, the following proposed "p urpose
clause" was drafted :

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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Something To Say

Purpose
The general purposes of the Law Alumni Society of the University of Pennsylvania are the
advancement of the interests of the Law School
the Society and its members, and the promotio~
and perpetuation of the spirit of good feeling and
commonality of interests among graduates of the
Law School. It seeks to accomplish these objectives by various means, including the planning of
meetings, social events and other opportunities for
interchange and communication among Alumni,
and between Alumni and the Faculty and Administration of the School, informing Alumni about their
School through appropriate publications, encouraging Alumni support through Annual Giving, aiding
students to find placement after graduation, and
sponsoring lectures and panel discussions on matters of current legal interest.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol14/iss2/1

Hopefully this clause will be adopted as a ByLaw amendment at the forthcoming Annual Meeting, along with a proposal to include the Chairman
of the Annual Giving campaign as an ex-officio
member of the Board. In such event, when I conclude my tenure as President, my successor will
have not only a new and enthusiastic Dean to work
with, but also a spanking new purpose clause to
guide him.
Whether Law Alumni Days past were legitimate or ultra vires activities, such a reunion certainly fits within our new purpose clause, and I
trust all of you will now feel more comfortable in
attending. Although the Annual Giving campaign
is now formally to be linked to the Society, as in
the past there will be no deliberate, willful or overt
solicitation of funds on Law Alumni Day.
I look forward to seeing you on April 24.

10
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The Challenge of
Administrative Legitimacy
By James 0. Freedman
The mere existence of a real and substantial doubt
as to the legitimacy of a government must surely
enfeeble it and strip it of moral force, even while
the lack of anything better keeps it going a while
longer.
Charles L. Black, Jr.,
The People and the Court (1960)

Editor's Note: The following chapter has been reprinted from Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American Government by james
0. Freedman by permission of Cambridge University Press© 1978. Mr. Freedman is Dean of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

Although the roots of the American administrative process reach back to the First Congress of
the United States, recognition of the profound implications that the growth of the administrative
process has had for the nation's legal and political
institutions came remarkably late. The significance
of administrative law in the United States emerged
clearly only when three remarkable scholarsFrank Goodnow at Columbia, Ernst Freund at
Chicago, and Felix Frankfurter at Harvard-began
to publish their pioneering work in the early
decades of the twentieth century. That work laid
the foundation for a systematic exploration of the
administrative process as a distinctive development
in American law.
Perhaps the nineteenth century's delay in
recognizing the implications of administrative law
reflected a reluctance to acknowledge the apparently anomalous fact that the administrative process
had become so important in a nation whose Constitution made no reference to it. But the American
reluctance to acknowledge the emerging significance of administrative law must have reflected
other factors as well because it ran parallel historically to the experience in Great Britain, a nation
without a written constitution. There, Dicey denied
as late as 1915 that a system of administrative law
existed in either England or the United States, even
though Maitland, lecturing in 1887-88, had reported that half the cases decided by the Queen's
Bench Division involved the rules of administrative
law.
Such denials became increasingly untenable in
the years immediately after Dicey wrote, particu-
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larly during the administration of Franklin D .
Roosevelt, when reliance upon the administrative
process as a principal instrumentality for the
achievement of national policies increased extensively. In the decades since the New Deal, what
Professor Frankfurter described in 1932 as "a vast
congeries of agencies" has grown apace with the
enlarged responsibilities of modern government.
In virtually every relevant respect, the administrative has become a fourth branch of government,
comparable in the scope of its authority and the
impact of its decision making to the three more
familiar constitutional branches.
The growth of the administrative process has
raised troubling questions concerning its implications for the character of American democracy, the
nature of American justice, and the quality of
American life. These questions have almost always
been based upon the premise that there is a crisis
in the administrative process. That successive generations of lawyers, judges, political scientists, and
citizens have failed to still the recurrent sense of
crisis attending the federal administrative process,
even though each has made important efforts to do
so, suggests that the sources of the sense of crisis
are more fundamental than the dominant concerns
of any particular historical moment would indicate.
The sense of crisis attending the administrative
process has, by its persistence, impaired the legitimacy of the federal administrative agencies. Because institutional legitimacy is an essential condition for institutional effectiveness, the sources of
the recurrent sense of crisis must be understood if
the administrative process is to fulfill the promise
that has animated the nation's repeated decisions
to rely upon it for the achievement of public
purposes.
The recurrent sense of crisis attending the federal administrative process derives from many factors. Perhaps the most prominent is the fact that
administrative agencies do not conform to three of
the most powerful conceptions of the American
imagination: the inviolability of the constitutional
prescription of a separation of governmental
powers, the importance of the judicial norm of
trial-type hearings for the fair determination of disputed questions, and the insistence that policy-

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol14/iss2/1

making officials of government be directly accountable to the people through political and electoral
processes. In each of these respects, the legitimacy
of the administrative process has been called into
question unfairly.
The belief that the administrative agencies of
the federal government are not entirely legitimate
because they do not conform to the constitutional
requirement of the separation of powers is misguided . The Constitution requires that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers be separated to
the extent necessary to prevent the emergence of
tyranny from the concentration of too much power
in a single person or institution. But the lines that
the Framers drew between the exercise of there-

"I have tried throughout these pages to give
evidence of my conviction that a scholar's most
fundamental obligation is to recognize that one of
the most important words in the English language
is 'perhaps'."
spective powers are not rigid ones, and in a number
of notable instances the Constitution permits·one
branch of government to participate in functions
assigned primarily to another branch. The conventional understanding of the separation of powers
that informs the American imaginations is simplistic by comparison to the flexible and pragmatic
vision that Madison and his contemporaries expressed in the Constitution itself.
The procedural departures that the administrative process makes from judicial norms have also
impaired the legitimacy of administrative regulation, primarily because of the uncritical faith that
Americans have traditionally placed in trial-type
proceedings of the kind employed by the courts.
Yet those departures have resulted in a system of
fact finding and decision making that, for many
substantive issues, is better suited to the attainment
of justice than trial-type proceedings would be. In
a period when the efficacy of adversary hearings is
being widely questioned, increasing adoption of
the less formal methods that characterize the administrative process seems likely. Perhaps that development will finally persuade Americans of what
Europeans learned long ago, that the fair and expeditious resolution of disputed questions can

12
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sometimes be achieved better by procedural
methods that depart from judicial norms.
The claim that administrative agencies lack a
democratic legitimacy because they are not di"The independent administrative agencies
quite obviously were not anticipated by james
Madison in The Federalist, but they are nonmajoritarian institutions of the kind that he regarded as
essential to the construction of an effective and
stable government."

rectly accountable to the people through the political process is similarly dubious. Although many
administrative agencies are independent of the
political branches in theory, they are subject in fact
to a considerable measure of control and influence
by the President and the Congress. Moreover, the
circumstance that administrative agencies are not
majoritarian in character does not distinguish them
from some of the most significant and necessary
institutions in our governmental system, institutions
whose legitimacy is seldom questioned on that
account. Indeed, a considerable part of the genius
of American government lies in the fact that public
policy has always been formed by a complicated,
Madisonian interplay between institutions of a
majoritarian character and those of a nonmajoritarian character.
The legitimacy of the administrative process
cannot turn, then, upon its nonconformity to a
simplistic version of the separation of powers, the
departures it makes from judicial norms, or the
formal independence of many agencies from direct
political accountability. Rather, it must be tested
pragmatically, by the responsiveness of administrative institutions to the most fundamental principles
of a democratic society and by the degree to which
administrative institutions meet the nation's highest
aspirations for justice and effective government.
Beyond the three factors just discussed, the
recurrent sense of crisis attending the administrative process derives from two related public attitudes: skepticism of administrative expertise and
concern with bureaucratization. There is an undoubted element of validity in both attitudes.
Administrative expertise, burdened with unrealistic
expectations, has not been translated into sound

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

11

public policy as frequently as the New Deal's idealized conception of its role anticipated. And administrative bureaucracy, as Weber foresaw and feared,
has often been impersonal, coercive, and dehumanizing in its manner of dealing with the lives and
fortunes of those it was created to serve. These
public attitudes toward expertise and bureaucracy
have been important factors in impairing the
legitimacy of the administrative process.
Yet the concerns that these attitudes express
are hardly limited in their application to the federal administrative process. Public skepticism of
administrative expertise is part of a larger loss of
faith in many traditional sources of public and
social authority. And public concern with bureaucratization is part of a larger pattern of social uneasiness over the impact upon American life of
large organizations, within both the public and
private sectors. The administrative agencies of the
federal government, in short, are not the exclusive
focus of these concerns; they are merely prominent
examples of wider social trends that Americans
understandably find disturbing.
Reliance upon administrative expertise and
administrative bureaucracy is likely to remain essential to the difficult and imperfect enterprise of
governing a continental nation of two hundred
million people. The important task facing those
concerned with this prospect is to devise means of
subjecting administrative expertise to democratic
and generalist control and of limiting the undesirable influences of bureaucracy upon the quality of
American life.
Finally, the recurrent sense of crisis attending
the federal administrative process reflects our
society's basic ambivalence toward the idea of economic regulation. During the years when the New
Deal was enlarging the role of administrative agencies as instrumentalities of modern government,
the people of the United States shared a common
commitment to the need for national recovery and
economic growth. The social consensus that supported that commitment was sufficiently pervasive
that philosophical differences over governmental
intervention in the economy were, for the moment,
put to the side.

13
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But the reality of those differences as matters
of public policy and democratic strategy inevitably
became more pronounced as society's shared objectives of national recovery and economic growth
were achieved. It now seems clear that the New
Deal's apparent success in achieving economic recovery by placing extensive reliance upon the administrative process merely served temporarily to
obscure the fact that Americans have not developed a coherent ideology of when, and to what
extent, governmental intervention in the economy
is appropriate. To this day the United States has
failed to resolve its basic ambivalence toward the
concept of governmental regulation of economic
activity.
The persistence of that ambivalence has had
adverse consequences for the legitimacy of the
administrative process. When the propriety of economic regulation is subject to philosophical as well
as pragmatic question, the legitimacy of the ad"The pervasive bureaucratization of the federal
administrative process-as profoundly disturbing as
it properly is-must be understood as part of a
larger trend toward bureaucratization common to
most of the advanced industrialized societies of the
world."

ministrative institutions created by Congress to perform specific regulatory responsibilities will also be
open to challenges of the same fundamental kind .
The ambivalence that has frustrated society's
attempts to formulate a coherent ideology of governmental intervention in the economy has also
caused Congress to legislate economic regulation
in evasive generalities, delegating to the respective
administrative agencies the essential task of resolving the fundamental political and social questions
that it has not been able to resolve its~lf. The freedom of Congress to delegate legislative power without instructive standards has been nurtured by the
Supreme Court's permissive interpretation of the
doctrine of the delegation of legislative power.
That most administrative agencies have finally
been unable to resolve satisfactorily questions that
Congress itself could not resolve is hardly surprising. Neve rtheless, the failures of the administrative
agencies to develop coherent policies in the course

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol14/iss2/1

of their regulatory activities has been a continuing
source of criticism. That criticism has had distressing implications for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the administrative process. It is important to
recognize that these implications are a result of
society's ambivalence toward economic regulation
and of the delegation doctrine that permits Congress to make the administrative process the focus
of that ambivalence; they are not the result of any
inherent qualities of the administrative process
itself.
The sources of the recurrent sense of crisis
attending the federal administrative process thus
prove, upon analysis, to be less forceful than at
first they seem. Many are based upon perceptions
that are misconceived as conclusions of historical
fact or misinformed as judgments of administrative
practice. Although there is a measure of validity in
some of these perceptions, the cumulative effect
is far from sufficient to support an indictment of
the legitimacy of the administrative process.
Still a further difficulty with the assertion that
there is a crisis in the administrative process arises
from the fact that it is usually phrased in indiscriminately general terms. The performance of the
federal administrative agencies varies so widely
that generalizations of that kind are quite impossible. Some agencies are highly respected for their
standard of performance; others are generally regarded as chronic failures.
These differences in the quality of agency performance are attributable to many factors, of which
perhaps the most decisive is the strength of the
public's support for an agency's substantive responsibilities. When public support for an agency's
statutory mandate is strong, the agency is likely to
perform effectively, as the history of the Securities
and Exchange Commission indicates. But when
public support for an agency's substantive mission
is ambivalent, the agency is likely to perform much
less effectively, as the experience of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission suggests. In
short, there are limits to the effective uses of the
administrative process, and these limits tend to coincide with the bounds of the social consensus on
an agency's statutory responsibilities. When society
does not respect these limits-when it requires ad-
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ministrative agencies to achieve more than public
opinion is ready to support unambivalently-it
condemns agencies to undertake tasks beyond their
institutional capacity to perform effectively.
Indiscriminately general assertions that there
is a crisis in the administrative process obscure the
facts that variations in agency performance do
exist and that there are limits to the effective uses
of the administrative process. It would be more
accurate, and less destructive of the legitimacy of
"Perhaps any institutional arrangement that
sought to take important public issues out of politics and lodge them in governmental agencies formally independent of executive control would
finally provoke skepticism in a nation committed
to principles of democratic accountability."

the administrative process as a whole, to speak of
failures in the performance of particular agencies.
And it would be more useful, in inquiring into the
factors that account for these failures, to consider
the possibility that, here as elsewhere, the fault may
lie not in the stars but in ourselves.
But however much reformers deride the administrative process for its failures of effectiveness,
political accountability, and fairness, they seem
invariably to fall back upon administrative regulation as the institutional method for implementing
their own programs of reform. The nation's repeated reliance upon administrative agencies to
meet the emerging problems of successive generations provides a historical basis for believing that
the United States is likely to have more, rather than
less, administrative regulation in the future. This
likelihood heightens the importance of understanding the fundamental sources of the recurrent sense
of crisis attending the federal administrative process. It also lends urgency to the related task of
constructing a theory of legitimacy for the role of
the administrative process in modern government.
It was Weber who described most powerfully
the impulse that motivates ordinary citizens to seek
a measure of legitimacy in the state's power to
coerce them. He regarded that impulse as a universal human characteristic: the need to find meaning
and justification in the social and political arrange-
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ments by which daily life is authoritatively bound.
The quest for understanding the implications of the
American administrative process is finally a search
for the sources and definition of its legitimacy.
The search is more than conventionally difficult because administrative agencies can point to
neither of the two principal methods by which
governmental power is typically legitimated in a
democracy, either creation by the Constitution or
exercise by officials directly accountable to the
people through the political process. Yet neither
method is invariably exclusive, and efforts to legitimate the exercise of administrative power properly
have stressed other factors as well, including the
need for new institutional forms of authority and
decision making to complement the legislature and
the courts, the responsiveness of the administrative
process to democratic constraints, the opportunities that administrative agencies permit for effective public participation, and the availability of
judicial review.
The relationship of procedural fairness to the
integrity of governmental institutions has, of
course, long been recognized . But too little attention has been given to the ways in which the quality of administrative justice supplies an important
source of administrative legitimacy. The procedural
rules by which a government agency reaches substantive decisions are significant evidences of the
nature of its commitment to protecting individual
rights and attaining just results . For these reasons,
the desire and capacity of government to devise
fair administrative procedures for the discharge of
its decision-making responsibilities is the essence
of democratic practice.
Fair administrative procedure most often results when Congress and the administrative agencies share with the courts the responsibility for
creating it. The Administrative Procedure Act has
been successfu I in achieving greater fairness in the
formal processes of adjudication and rule making
because Congress, in drafting its central provisions,
struck a workable balance between prescribing
fundamental principles of fair procedure and permitting administrative agencies the freedom to
adapt these principles to the disparate patterns of
their regu Ia tory responsi bi I ities.
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An opportunity of the character that the draftsmen of the Administrative Procedure Act grasped
in 1946 now confronts those concerned with the
fairness of the informal, discretionary processes of
administrative agencies. Although the importance
of informal agency action has been recognized for
a generation, only recently have students of the
administrative process begun to suggest systematic
approaches to understanding its nature. The procedures by which a large number of administrative
agencies and the courts have sought to govern the
"When Alexis de Tocqueville published his remarkable study of democracy in America, he expressed a nineteenth-century European's admiration
for the ease with which Americans did without
government. It is not likely that a contemporary
European observor, retracing Tocqueville's footsteps, would be led to express a similar admiration."

exercise of informal authority suggests that society
can limit the risks of unfairness associated with
discretionary administrative action without sacrificing the special competence to act effectively
that informal procedures typically permit.
The task of devising an effective theory of the
legitimacy of the administrative process is one of
the most important challenges facing those concerned with American administrative law and institutions. That challenge requires that the recurrent
sense of crisis attending the federal administrative
process be examined candidly, and that effective
administrative procedures be devised; for formal
and informal proceedings, that give promise of
being fair, efficient, and responsive to democratic
values and constitutional restraints.
As the role of the administrative process in
American government grows in scope and authority, systematic reconsideration of administrative
procedure becomes a philosophic and practical
necessity. One can hope, as Professor Frankfurter
wrote of his generation 's quest to understand the
administrative process, that " efforts at systematization may themselves be creative forces."

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol14/iss2/1
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Conveuatlon w1th ...
Assistant Professors
Regina Austin, '73 and
Alan T. Cathcart, '74

Editor's Note: Both Regina Austin
and Alan Cathcart are Alumni of
Penn Law School who chose, at
this juncture in their careers, to
return to the School as professors.
Ms. Austin, a native of Washington, D.C., received a B.A. from
the University of Rochester and
was graduated, cum laude, from
the Law School in 1973, where she
was elected to the Order of the
Coif. After a year as law clerk to
judge Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr. of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, she
worked as an associate at the
Philadelphia firm of Schnader,
Harrison , Segal & Lewis. Professor
Austin joined the Faculty in 1977
and teaches Torts and In surance.
Professor Cathcart was born
in Glendale, California and lived
most of his life in the western
part of the United States. He was
graduated from Stanford University in 1969 with a B.S. degree in
Mathematics and, for one year,
was a volunteer teacher with the
Peace Corps in Yonibana, Sierra
Leone, West Africa. Cathcart was
a magna cum laude graduate of
the Law School in 1974 and, as a
student, was Executive Editor of
the Law Review. He served as law
clerk to judge Theodore Tannenwald, jr. of the United States Tax
Court in Washington, D.C. and
then became associated with Lee,
Toomey & Kent, a Washington
firm specializing primarily in tax
work . Mr. Cathcart is one of the
Law School's newest Faculty
members, having arrived in September, 1978. He teaches Tax.

journal: As fairly recent Alumni of
this Law School, are you realizing
a fantasy by occupying the opposite side of the podium?
Austin: I can't say that I ever contemplated returning here as a law
professor since, as a student, I
viewed my professors as being
somewhere up there and to the
right. I enjoyed law school; I like
to study. I gave little thought to
preparing myself for the classroom . In fact, I was about to become a junior high school teacher
when I came to my senses and
decided to enter law school.
Cathcart: My experiences were
different. I knew, before having
left the Law School that I wanted
to teach someday, and returning
to the place that I was most familiar with seemed very appealing.
journal: Has this teaching experience been all that you had anticipated?
Cathcart: Well, as a former secondary school teacher, I had already learned that teaching is not
as easy as it looks. Yet, one thinks
of teaching-especially on the
graduate level-as a contemple~
tive life with acres of uncommitted time ...
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Austin: And no deadlines! No
time sheets!! When I decided to
become a law professor, it did not
occur to me that I would be
standing in front of a class of 100
students four times a week. I
thought that teaching would provide the one opportunity I longed
for-to be able to live in the
library without being teased .
journal: And not only has that
proven to be the impossible dream
but, in addition to classroom responsibilities, part of a Fa culty
member's duties is committee
work-a variation of the extracurricular activity. Do you find
these "activities" intrusive?
Austin: For an untenured faculty
member, committee work can
consume valuable segments of
time that might otherwise be
devoted to scholarly pursuits.
Don' t get the wrong idea, though.
I am a member of the Law
School 's Admissions Committee
and serve as chairman of the subcommittee on Special Adminissions. I also serve on two University-wide committees. Needless to
say, I consider these important,
worthwhile activities. Committee
work is an obligation of the posi-
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tion , and each member of the
Faculty must share part of the
load.
Cathcart: I am not a really great
committee person .
Journal: Has the practical experi~nce.that you acquired during the
mtenm between graduation and
your return to the Law School as
professors proven a valuable tool
to your teaching?
Austin: I worked at Schnader
Harrison , Segal & Lewis in PhiladeiP,hia for 3 years, as an office
litigator. I like to write. I was in
practice long enough to know the
limitations of the theories 1 talk
about, but I do not impart "wisdom " based on my experiences.
Cathcart: After a 2 year clerkship
at the United States Tax Court 1
practiced in Washington with ' Lee,
Toomey & Kent specializing, of
course, in tax. I am presently
te~ching Tax II which deals largely
wrth corporate problems, and my
practical exposure to them has
been invaluable. On the other
hand, while in practice 1 continued to take an academic interest
in the problems with which 1 was
working. It is always important to
combine these two elements. 1
taught the basic tax course during
my first semester here and was
able to bring to bear the experiences I had acquired while clerkin~ on the Tax Court. It has proven
qurte effective to be able to illustrate from personal experience
what abstract theories mean in
application.
Journal: Tax is an exacting, complicated area of the law which if
not presented with creativity, '
could possibly becom e tedious
and difficult to teach and to ab-

sorb. How do you engender
excitement for your subject?
Cathcart: I can give you no assurance that I have risen above
~edium but do try by deemphasizrng detail. The book I used when
teaching Tax I was very rich in
detail. By treating examples as
illustrations, not as rules to be
memorized, the number of concepts that people have to think
about is reduced.
Journal: For those who contemplate teaching in the future, what
were the events which led to your
return to academia?
Cathcart: As I mentioned, 1 always
wanted to teach. My understanding was that a clerkship was one
of the steps that prospective
teachers took, so my 2 year stint
with the Tax Court was an asset.
After the clerkship, I looked
around at some schools but decided that, prior to teaching, 1
should have some practical experience. After a couple of years
in practice I felt myself becoming
almost too comfortable and
happy with firm work, so much so
that it seemed unlikely 1 would
ever want to leave. At the right
psychological moment, however,
Noyes Leech called to ask if 1
was interested in being considered for a teaching position . 1 decided , at that point, that if I was
going to teach , it should be now
or never. So here I am-giving it
a try.
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Austin: After I indicated to a few
of my professors that I was interested in teaching, I was contacted
by several schools. I received an
offer from Penn fairly early in the
process, but delayed my arrival
for a year-and-a-half. This. is a
good environment and I like to
teach . The large classes that intimidated me at the outset no
longer do so ; in fact, I a~ a bit of
a ham . Those graduates interested
in teaching should contactProfessor Curtis Reitz.
Cathcart: Yes, he perpetually
maintains a list of graduates interested in teaching. I was on that list
for quite a while and received letters regularly from Penn and from
other schools as well-all relaying
opportunities for teaching.
Journal: Are tax specialists in demand in the teaching profession?
Cathcart: Tax teachers are most
desirable creatures-the field is
great for those interested.
Journal: Do you often wonder
how effectively you are reaching
your students? What feedback
have you received?
Cathcart: I don 't hear much but
have been pleasantly surprised at
some of the give-and-take that has
been developing between my students and me. I was surprised to
discover how extensively one must
be prepared when coming to class
everyday. The level of preparation
is tremendously demanding.
Journal: In addition to the pressures of remaining abreast of and
'
in fact, beyond the classroom
situation , isn ' t it also the teacher's
responsibility to interpret one's
subject and make it his or her
own?
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Austin: Yes. There is a gigantic
difference between learning material in order to take an examination and making it your own intellectual tool. In preparing for my
first year torts course, I had to read
nearly 75 years worth of scholarly
literature in order to understand
negligence and the concept of
"fault" (one of Professor Morris'
favorite words). Torts has become,
for me, an exciting subject that
generates fascinating debates between various scholars who have
their own competing approaches
and theories.
Journal: And what your students
want to know is the Austin approach and theory. This, one ..
imagines, is where your creat1v1ty
as scholar and teacher is truly
challenged.
Austin: Yes. And one's teaching
should be the foundation of one's
writing. I would even go so far as
to say that one cannot be a really
good teacher unless he also writes.
Good writing requires that a person bring his full critical faculties
to bear on a subject and, systematically, articulate his own perspective. Intellectual growth i~
tremendously important. It bnngs
security to the classroom.
Journal: Although it has not been
a long time since your graduation
from Penn Law School, have you
perceived any changes in student
attitudes or the way in which the
School is functioning?
Cathcart: 1 was a member of the
Class of 1974. We were very
iconoclastic, the presumption
being that anyone in authority was
wrong. Many saw that presumption borne out in their relations to
the School and, to some extent, it

may have been a self-fulfilling
prophecy. People came expecting
to be at odds with the administration and, in fact, there was friction.
Journal: Were these problems a
carry-over of 1960's rebelliousness
and dissatisfaction with authority?
Cathcart: A great many of us had
been undergraduate students in
the '60's and had gone through
the college experience attendant
to that time, which was one of
discontent-largely with the War,
but it spilled over to other areas
as well. These influences made us
a pretty cynical group. If my
memories are more pleasant than
others, it is probably because I
generally belonged to that part of
the student body the School was
accused of favoring to the neglect
of the majority.
Today I do not sense the
restiveness among students that
was present during my days here.
Possibly economics has forced
people to be more interested in
going about the business of
learning. Educational costs were
scandalous when I was a law student and they are proving to be
moreso today. 1 sense the feeling
to be that if this enormous amount
of money is being spent for a professional education , then one
should (a) get as much of it as is
possible and (b) get it over with
as soon as possible.
Journal: Do you sense any idealism filtering through these atti-
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tudes? Is there any talk of " changing the world"?
Cathcart: I think that the most
dramatic change a law student
experiences over the 3 year period
is in his or her expectations. Don't
you agree, Regina, that there are
many more prospective idealists
in the entering classes than there
are in the graduating classes?
Austin: Probably. The process
does tend to produce conservative thinkers and practitioners, but
it may be a mistake to conclude
that this generation of students is
not as public interest/ change-theworld oriented as we were.
Cathcart: I disagree with those
who say that we spend 3 years
tailoring people for pin-striped
suits and that the process is designed to take prospective idealists and turn them into corporate
lawyers.
Journal: You both teach very practical courses so it may be difficult
to emphasize "idealism ."
Cathcart: In my own course, I
have taught on a reasonably practical level and frequently put people into the position of a private
lawyer advising a client. In tax
law that's about all one can do
wh~n hypothesizing about the
application of existing law into
fact.
Austin: I don't know. how to teach
torts without talking about policy
and competing interests. From my
perspective, every course can be a
policy course, and that's what
makes for a first-rate law professor and a first-rate law school. It's
not enough simply to teach the
rules. Rules change.
Cathcart: That's so right. And what
we really should be trying to give
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to our students is the notion of
how and why the rules change, so
that they can be in a position to
understand developments as they
come along and to predict what
developments are likely to occur.
These are very practical skills and
99% of our graduates will be putting their skills to practical use.
Austin: I think the notion abounds
that law school is about one thing
and that practice is about another
-that there is a conflict between
the philosophy of legal teaching
and th e realities of practice.
Cathcart: I think it is true that
practice is about something in
addition to what we do but I,
personally, didn 't sense any lack
of continuity as I moved from student to practicing attorney and
now back to academia as a professor. There can always be a shift
in emphasis, of course, depending
upon the nature of one's practice.
In my practice, there was always a
very theoretical approach to
problems.
journal: As students here, who
were your heroes-the Faculty
members you most admired?
Austin: Martha Field! I miss her. I
have been teaching here for two
years and she will have been gone
for all but one semester. She was
a fantastic teacher and just has a
tremendous amount of guts.
Cathcart: My classroom ideal was
and is Marty Aronstein. He has my
deepest admiration for th e superb
way he manages a classroom . If I
had a teacher upon whom I would
want to model myself, it would
be Marty. Anoth er is Leo Levin.
Leo is one of the super tactici ans
of th e classroom .

Austin: Ah , yes! He is also one of
the great all-time podium walkers.
journal: Speaking of that, how do
you comport yourse1ves in the
classroom? Are you active or do
you sit?
Cathcart: I find that I walk a lot.
I don't know if it is nervous
energy. I do know that I can't
stand in one place and talk at
people. I feel more conversational
if I move around.
Austin: I do not think about what
I am doing. I sometimes find myself at one end of the podium
with my case books and notes at
the other end. Every once in awhile
I catch myself and say, "What am
I doing up here?"
journal (to Austin): You are
unique on this Faculty-the only
woman, and one of two Black
professors, the other being Professor Ralph Smith . You appear to
have adjusted satisfactorily to this
singular position.
Austin: Well I certainly would
hope to have more company here
soon-on both counts. As for myself, I have no problems with my
colleagues or life here in general.
I think it would be nice if the base
were broadened, that's all.
journal: You mentioned earlier,
Professor Austin , that a good educator's teaching should be "the
foundation of [his/ her] writing."
Are either of you presently engaged in scholarly work?
Austin: As soon as my 5 day-aweek schedule ends, I am going
to begin writing.
Cathcart:_I just filed an application
for a summer fellowship to do
work on a paper entitled " Property and Obligation in the Federal
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Income Tax. " I have just completed-with former Dean and
now Professor Bernard Wolfman
-the 1979 Supplement to his
book on Federal Income Taxation
and Business Exterprise. We have
collaborated on two previous supplements since I have graduated.
journal: Hanging on your wall,
Professor Cathcart-preserved for
posterity-is the plaster cast impressions of two mini-hands, obviously not yours.
Cathcart: They belong to my two
daughters-ages 5 and 2.
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Editor's Note: Gerald McHugh will receive his
}.0. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School
in May, 1979. This article, an adaptation from areport delivered to the Theology faculty of St.
joseph's College in Philadelphia where McHugh
received his B.A. degree, is part of his larger work
-a book, Christian Faith and Criminal Justice:

Toward a Christian Response to Crime and Punishment. (Paulist Press , New York , 1978). Mr. McHugh
has worked extensively within the prison system as
counselor, trainer and operations director of the
Thresholds Program, a project of the Philadelphia
Prison System.

Penology in America:
A Theological Perspective
by Gerald Austin McHugh, Jr., '79
The historical link between western penal customs and the Christian religion is frequently overlooked when the subject of penalogy arises today.
Likewise, in modern theology, the cultural and
ethical challenges presented by penology are
seldom a focus for reflection . This situation is
unfortunate because Christian theology and history
provide many insights into both the evolution and
the morality of contemporary penal practice.
To understand Christianity's historical influence on the evolution of penology and criminal
law, it is best to begin by considering the practices
which prevailed before Christianity came into
existance. Prior to the time of Christ, the criminal
law was essentially an objective code. By this I
mean that if an individual had committed a certain crime, then he would have had to pay a set
penalty for that crime. For instance, had I committed murder, I might have had to pay a penalty
of so many cattle or horses, or a sum of money to
the victim's survivors to avoid the possibility of a
blood feud. Generally, however, no issue of moral
guilt was raised because no concepts of personal
responsibility or freedom uf will were indigenous
to most early cultures. Crime was simply one of the
harsher realities in an already harsh life. Once
crime occurred, the offender paid the penalty and
life continued as usual. (The Jewish culture was, of
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course, the notable exception to prevailing practice, and many Jewish conceptions of the nature
and function of law and punishment were later
adopted by the Christian religion.)
As Christianity evolved, gradually "subjective"
elements
worked their way into the criminal law.
Offenders were not simply forced by their communities to make payment for their offenses, but
several inferences were made about them which,
in turn, influenced the way in which western civilization came to treat criminals.
First, Christianity played a prominent role in
introducing a moral dimension to the criminal law.
Crime was no longer conceived solely as a physical
act, something external. Rather, it came to be
viewed as a symptom of the larger condition of
humankind, namely sinfulness. Consequently, with
the growth of Christianity's influence in secular
government, the ideas of crime and sin slowly
began to merge. By the time of Constantine, they
were no longer independent concepts. Many sins
were written into the criminal codes and virtually
all isolations of the criminal code were considered
sins.
Second, the notion of personal responsibility
began to develop as an idea, the belief that an
individual should be held accountable for his/ her
actions. Closely allied with this concept were those
of guilt and repentance which taught that since the
individual person was the author-the source of
his actions, he should be expected to feel remorse
and to make amends.
The final element was free will, which maintained that the human person had the freedom of
choice to good or to do. evil. Crime then eventually came to be defined as a free, willful act committed by an individual with an intent to do evil.
The concept of free will was a necessary, logical
corollary to those of morality and responsibility,
for only if individuals can choose not to commit
crime is it reasonable to hold them accountable
for their acts.
Without resorting to a detailed history of
criminal law, it is clear that in large part our understanding of crime today is evolved from Christian
moral theology. Under the common law, a crime
basically consists of two components: one being
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the " actus reus," the physical act entailed in a
crime, the other being the " mens rea," which,
generally defined, refers to the offender's mental
state. Even if one commits a prohibited act, it is
possible in certain narrowly defined circumstances
to escape or diminish liability by showing a lack of
"criminal intent" or "motive." The concept of
mens rea is derived from Canon Law. Church
courts were just as interested in the moral development of offenders as they were in regulating their
external actions. Offenses were sins and, in the
traditional Church formulation, there can be no
sin unless there is a willful! intention to commit
sin. Accordingly, Church courts were preoccupied
with questions of culpability when judging
offenses. Likewise, penalties imposed by Church
courts were specifically tailored to the individual
and his relative stage of moral development. This
approach to crime generally was adopted wholesale by some early civil courts which were illequipped to employ the mens rea concept with the
same precision.
One result of this interrelationship is that
Christianity has given a great deal of force and
legitimacy to the criminal law and the state as protectors of moral values. Until Constantine, Church
courts usually handled ecclesiastical affairs, while
Roman courts dealt with civil affairs. When Constantine embraced Christianity, he gave Church
courts jurisdiction over a number of civil offenses.
Likewise, he enacted many symbolic laws designed
to force a link between the Christian Church and
the Roman Empire.
Historically, the conversion of Constantine and
the subsequent alliance of Church and state were
significant. Christians were no longer the persecuted, the minority in a larger, hostile society. Nor
could they remain a self-contained community
waiting for the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven.
They were forced to confront social and political
situations because the state had draped itself in the
mantle of the Church. Thus the Church could no
longer automatically assume the role of advocate
for the underdog. Christianity was no longer simply the religion which proclaimed freedom to
prisoners-it was also the official creed of a state
which held prisoners. The Christian ethic was
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thereby invoked by what was still basically a ruthless, pagan government, a development which
posed numerous challenges to the Church as it
attempted to establish its identity and mission on
earth. That the Church as a result sometimes failed
to remain true to its promise became clear over
time.
With the collapse of the Roman Empire,
church-state distinctions were blurred even
further. As English historian Richard Southern has
suggested, "the Middle Ages may be defined as the
period in western European history when the
Church could reasonably claim to be the one true
state, and when men ... acted on the assumption
that the Church had an overriding political authority." Civil governments during the Middle Ages
were often unstable or non-existent, and the
Church was a natural institution to provide some
semblance of social order and law enforcement.
The Church represented not just the Kingdom of
Heaven, but also the kingdoms on earth.
These historical developments in turn led to
two critical problems in Christianity. The first, as
mentioned before, was the tension between the
Church's role as defender of the oppressed and
proclaimer of salvation to all people, its role being
a socio-political institution concerned with maintaining order. The Church was to save sinners, but
it was to restrain them as well. This dilemma was
resolved for the most part by assuming that the
restraint and punishment of offenders was in their
own best interest or, as the proverb goes, "better
to burn for a few minutes pn earth than to burn
forever in hell." Punishment was defended on
grounds of expiation and retribution. Thus, the
punishment of criminals came to be viewed as
God's work, with the result that some of theremarkable conciliatory spirit characteristic of the
early Church was lost.
A second problem was that the state was
bestowed with much unquestioned moral authority and legitimacy as administrator of the law. With
the decline of the Church as a political force
throughout Europe, administration of the criminal
law was largely assumed by the state, such that
Church courts were no longer involved in criminal
justice. The problem arose in that the action of the
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state was still viewed as reflecting the action of
God. As law professor Nicholas Kittrie wrote: "This
transfer of functions reflected little change in the
public attitude that 'do's will' was served by
present and earthly punishment, a belief that provided both executioner and spectator with the
feeling that they were participating in the 'Lord's
work.'" Christian thought and culture focused
more on the state's potential for good, rather than
the potential for misuse of power by the state to
oppress its citizens. The political authority of the
state came to be endowed with a kind of divine
sanction. The Church's prophetic role as a critic of
the state suffered as a result; Christianity as a force
for reform dwindled.
There was, however, a critical difference between Church and state goals in dealing with
offenders. The Church in its worst moments may
have condoned and even practiced brutal methods
of "criminal justice," but certainly in theory (however much our understanding of crime and justice
has progressed since then) swch practices were very
much concerned with the "salvation" of the individual offender. With the development of the state
as a separate entity from the Church, on the other
hand, while punishment to a large extent remained
cloaked in religious justification, there occurred a
subtle but crucial change in its intent. Political
authorities, as a rule, beyond paying lip-service to
allegedly Christian ideals, were hardly concerned
with individual salvation or the vindication of
divine law on earth. They were concerned with
maintenance of social order, the protection of their
power within what was a hierarchical society, and
the smooth functioning of the state. Throughout
modern times, although the moral overtones and
much of the religious symbolism of criminal "justice" have survived in various forms in American
civil religion, the institutions of criminal justice
have plainly functioned as secular entities designed
to exercise social control, often at great individual
expense. The popular cultural assumption which
resulted from the overlap of church and statethat political institutions by nature function to
serve the common good-survives to this day as a
root cause of apathy about criminal justice reform.

23

Penn Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
22

Penology in America

Aside from historical inquiry aimed at understanding the origins of institutions, another area of
theological interest is the ethical challenge raised
by the tension between penal ideology and Christian belief. For close scrutiny which delves behind
popular assumptions and "civil religion" indicates
that Christian theology assumes an entirely different
world-view and set of values than does penal
ideology. To gain some appreciation for these
challenges, one need only summarily consider two
theories of punishment: retribution and deterrence.
Retribution has popularly been expressed as a
form of legitimate vengeance for wrongs done"an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth ." If a
criminal commits an offense, society punishes him
in return so that he is given retribution for what he
has done. The Old Testament passage which expresses the biblical/ex talionis is frequently alluded
to in support for retribution, surprisingly even in
more sophisticated defenses of punishment.
Such co-optation of religious thought is disturbing to any student of theology for two reasons.
First, because it is absurd to generalize from the
ancient Hebrew experience which is grounded in
a theocratic tradition (a nation dedicated to religion and guided by religious principles), to a
modern democracy where church and state are
institutionally separate and often are at odds on
moral issues.
The fatal flaw in adoption of the /ex talionis as
an endorsement of vengeance or retribution, however, is that it was quite the opposite. Scripture
scholars have concluded that this prescription was
not an imperative to seek vengeance ; it was intended as a limit on the excessive vengeance
wrought against offenders common to that time. In
reality it meant no more than an eye for an eye
could be exacted as a penalty; it introduced proportionality to punishment. It certainly did not
command the seeking of retribution as a method of
establishing justice.
Much of the belief in retribution is based
purely on the craving for vengeance, and some
sociological theorists are straightforward in so stating. They argue that since the community demands
vengeance when a crime has been committed, it
must, as a matter of social equilibrium, have such
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vengeance. This may in fact be sound sociology.
No detailed exposition of Christian ethics is required, however, to establish that such unmitigated
acceptance of vengeance is incompatible with a
Christian world-view. The New Testament, taken
as a whole, rejects such a stance outright.
There are, however, far more subtle models of
retribution, one in particular which grew from the
traditions of the medieval church. In the Middle
Ages, when the Church was accepted as bringing
divine will into earthly institutions, punishment was
accepted as reflecting the will of God. This view
was planted in American thought by the early Puritans. Plainly, however, such a perspective would
not survive today except in popular cultural forms.
Traditionally the Roman Church has advanced
two justifications for punishment. The first is that
punishment is justified if it is medicinal; in other
words if it serves to reform the individual subjected to punishment. The second justification is
that punishment is acceptable when it is expiatory,
which is to say that it cleanses or purifies the soul
of whomever is punished. Applied to ecclesiastical
structures, such principles have functioned admirably in creating a person-centered body of Church
law. Drawing upon this tradition, however, a conclusion some social theologians have drawn is that
secular systems of criminal justice can be similarly
justified.
As applied to secular law, this justification can
be subjected to substantial criticism. It ignores the
historical dimension of theological inquiry, and the
critical differences in the evolution of church and
state. For punishm ent by imprisonment In America
reforms precious few individuals. On the contrary,
it embitters, dehumanizes, and brutalizes the majority of those who experience it. Imprisonment
does not purify human beings-it corrupts them .
Abstract arguments on the beneficial aspects of
punishment lack sufficient humanistic focus to be
persuasive. In the final analysis such arguments are
valid only in a historical vacuum.
Retribution theory also distorts classic JudeaChristian conceptions of justice by implicitly reducing the concept of justice into separate components: distributive justice referring to the allocation
of resources in society, (i.e. social justice), and
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retributive justice referring to the maintenance of
proper order in society by the punishment of
offenses, (i.e. criminal justice) . This distinction,
totally alien to biblical thought, allows us to zealously pursue the punishment of criminals while
ignoring larger social inequities which are the root
of crime.
To suggest that punishment is a necessary evil
in achieving limited goals of social protection may
accurately state the case; to attempt its defense on
any loftier plane is a nearly impossible task.
Even this cursory review of a wide spectrum of
history and theology indicates that modern thinkers
have left many fruitful avenues untouched. Plainly
there is a need to distill the historical ingredients
which comprise contemporary penal practice to
expose the assumptions on which it rests. Similarly,
a variety of cultural and ethical assumptions about
the validity of penal practice and theories when
viewed closely may prove to be inconsistent with
even more fundamental theological beliefs. Such
inquiry, whether pursued by " professional" intellectuals or individual believers and humanists,
may ultimately prove to be the best catalyst in
sparking widespread interest in penal reform .
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Assistant Professor Henry Hansmann received his PH.D. in Economics from Yale University in
December, 1978.

Associate Dean Morris S. Arnold
has been elected a member of the
Society for the Comparative History of Law and Institutions of the
Socialist Republic of Roumania.
Professor Alexander Capron spoke
on "Public Intervention in Scientific Research: Prometheus Revisited?" at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in September.
He also participated in a biannual
conference of the Ohio Commission on lnterprofessional Education (which consists of the major
schools at Ohio State University
and the state's leading professional organizations such as the
Bar and Medical Associations).
Held in November in Columbus,
the Conference's theme was "The
Humanity of the Professions."
Professor Capron addressed the
subject "Breakdown of Trust: Professional Malpractice as a Symptom of Impersonalization."
Esther L. Cooperman, Assistant
Placement Director, has been
elected to a 4 year term as a member of the Board of Managers of
Swarthmore College.

Professor George L. Haskins has
been appointed to permanent
membership in the Romanian
Association for the History of
Comparative Law and Institutions.
He has, in addition, been invited
by the President of the Italian
Society for Legal History (Societa
ltaliana di Storia del Diritto) to
deliver a paper on a topic of his
own selection before the Society's
Fourth International Congress,
meeting at Naples in the spring of
1980.

Professor jan Z. Krasnowiecki delivered a lecture, "Reflections on
Shared Amenities Housing," to
the Federal National Mortgage
Association General Counsel's
Conference in Savannah, Georgia
in March.
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Carrie Menkei-Meadow, Lecturer
and Clinical Supervisor, is a consultant for the American Bar
Association's Special Committee
on the Delivery of Legal Services.
She is also the evaluator for the
ABA sponsored 59th Street Legal
Clinic in Philadelphia.
Assistant Dean <;:hristopher F.
Mooney attended an invitational
conference in january on "Legal
and Ethical Aspects of Religious
Liberty" sponsored by the Institute
of Social Ethics of the University
of Southern California Law Center. In February, he visited 6 universities in the south to recruit
minority students under a grant
from the Graduate and Professional Opportunities Program.
Also in February, Mr. Mooney delivered the Monroe-Paine Lecture
in Religion at the University of
Missouri entitled "The Future of
the Human Species: The Evolutionary Thought of Pierre Teilhard
de Chardin." In April, his speaking engagements include a lecture
to the faculty of St. joseph's University-"Death and the Phenomenon of Life" and a lecture to
the Pennsylvania Conference on
Interchurch Cooperation, "Public
Morality and Government."
Hubbell Professor of International
Law Emeritus and former Acting
Dean Covey T. Oliver has been ·
Visiting Tsanoff Professor at the
jesse H. jones Graduate School of
Administration at Rice University
in Houston, Texas since january,
1979. In late May, Mr. Oliver will
teach Admiralty at the Southern
Methodist Law School, before returning to the Philadelphia region
in August, 1979.
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Visiting Professor Welsh S. White,
has written an article, Police
Trickery in Inducing Confessions,

which appears in the spring edition of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. He will
begin assisting the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, also this spring, in
a death penalty case where the
issue involves the validity of
death penalties imposed by a
death-qualified jury.
Professor Curtis R. Reitz' book,
Consumer Protection Under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act has

been published by ALI-ABA,
December 1978.
Professor louis B. Schwartz addressed the Brookings Institution
Seminar on the Administration of
justice at Williamsburg, Virginia in
March. He spoke on the Reform
of the Federal Criminal Code to
an audience consisting of Chief
justice Burger, Attorney General
Bell, members of the Judiciary
Committees of the Senate and
House, and the Chief Justices o~
State Courts. Professor Leo levm
also attended in his capacity as
Director of the U.S. Federal
judicial Center.

Assistant Professor Daniel Segal
has written , Survey of the Literature of Discovery from 1970 to the
Present: Expressed Dissatisfactions
and Proposed Reforms, published

by The Judicial Center in
Washington.

Assistant Professor Ralph R. Smith

has been reelected to the Association of American Law Schools
for the fourth consecutive year.
He is also chair-Elect of the AALS
Section on Minority Groups, his
term of Chair to commence in
january, 1980.
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'28

Harry Norman Ball has
become counsel to the firm of
Busch & Schramm, 555 E. City
Line Avenue, Bala-Cynwyd, PA,

19004
Gerald D. Prather of
Meadville, Pennsylvania, was
honored in September, 1978, by
the Crawford County Bar Association for 50 years of active
service in the legal profession.

'35

Daniel W. long of
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania
served as borough solicitor for
33-years before his resignation of
the post in December, 1978.

'38

leonard l. Ettinger has
been appointed Chairman of the
Legal Directory Committee of the
Philadelphia Bar Association.

'39

leon S. Forman of the
Philadelphia firm Wexler, Weisman, Maurer & Forman, is cochairman for planning of the upcoming course of study on "The
New Federal Bankruptcy Code"
sponsored by the ALI-ABA Committee on Continuing Professional
Education.

'41
R. Stewart Rauch,
former Chairman of the Board of
the Philadelphia Savings Fund
Society, was named as recipient of
the 1977 Philadelphia Award. The
Award includes a $15,000 cash
prize to a person in the Delaware
Valley area who has advanced the
"best and largest interest of the
community."

'43
Joseph N. Bongiovanni,
Jr. has been named Chairman of
the Charter & Bylaws Committee
of the Philadelphia Bar Association.
Hon. Phyllis A. Kravitch
of Savannah, Georgia, currently a
judge of the Superior Court of
Georgia, has been nominated by
President Carter to a seat on the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. If
the nomination is confirmed by
the Senate, judge Kravitch will become the second federal appellate
judge who is a woman.
'48

Mitchell W. Miller of
the National Bankruptcy Clinic,
Inc., Philadelphia, addressed the
second annual National Conference of the American Legal Clinic
Association in Orlando, Florida.
Bernard Wolfman, former
Dean of Penn Law School and
presently Professor of Law at
Harvard, has been elected to the
Council of the American Association of University Professors.
He was the Association's General
Counsel from 1966-68.

'49
Hon. louis G. Hill of
the Municipal Court of Philadelphia is a candidate for judge of
the Court of Common Pleas. Judge
Hill, a former state Senator,
chaired the Pennsylvania Senate
judiciary Committee for 7 years
and sponsored more than 60 Acts
dealing with judicial matters.
'50
Robert A. Hauslohner
of Philadelphia has been elected
treasurer of the Board of Trustees
of The Philadelphia Museum of
Art.
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'51
Harold Berger has been
appointed Chairman of the International Law Committee of the
Philadelphia Bar Association.
Arthur R. littleton is the
newly appointed Chairman of the
Client's Security Fund Committee
of the Philadelphia Bar Association.
Donald G. Oyler of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, has been
elected President of the Adams
County Bar Association.

'52
Edward W. Madeira, Jr.,
has been named Chairman of the
Federal Bench-Bar Committee of
the Philadelphia Bar Association.
John T. Miller of York,
Pennsylvania, has been elected
Treasurer of the York County Bar
Association.
'53
Hon. David N. Savitt,
Court Administrator of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas,
had declared his candidacy for a
seat in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. In addition, judge
Savitt published an article, New
Sentencing Act: An Analysis, in
the December 11,1978 issue of
The Pennsylvania Law journal.
'54
Jerome B. Apfel has
been appointed Chairman of the
Mental Health Committee of the
Philadelphia Bar Association.
Robert Montgomery Scott,
a partner in the Philadelphia firm
of Montgomery, McCracken,
Walker & Rhoads, has been appointed a Vice-President of the
Board of Trustees of The Philadelphia Museum of Art. He is also
a member of the Philadelphia
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International City Coordinating
Committee, a body to help coordinate activities which will aid
in making Philadelphia an International City.
Morris M. Shuster has been
named Chairman of the Legislative Liaison Committee of the
Philadelphia Bar Association.

'55
Step hen M. Feldman is
Chairman of the Amicus Curiae
Committee of the Philadelphia
Bar Association.
Hon. Irving M. Hirsh was
recently appointed to his third
term with the North Plainfield,
New Jersey Municipal Court.
James M. Richardson has
become associated with the firm
of Busch & Schramm, 555 E. City
Line Avenue, Bala Cynwyd, PA,
19004.
Mervin M. Wilf of the
Philadelphia firm Hudson, Wilf &
Kronfeld, was planning chairman
for the annual course of study on
"Pension, Profit-Sharing, and
Other Deferred Compensation
Plans" held in March under the
sponsorship of the ALI-ABA, in
San Francisco.
. Ominsky has
Hams
been appointed Chairman of the
Professional Education Committee
of the Philadelphia Bar Association.
Delores Korman Sloviter has
been nominated by President
Carter to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

paper and participated as a
panalist at a symposium of the
American College of Chest Physicians International Conference on
Occupational Lung Disease in
San Francisco. The paper was
entitled Meanings of "Impairment" and "Disability": The Conflicting Social Objectives Underlying the Confusion.

'58

Raymond L. Hovis has
been elected Second VicePresident of the York (PA.) County
Bar Association.

'59

H. Donald Busch has

formed, together with Arthur E.
Schramm, Jr., '68, a firm for the
General Practice of Law-Busch &
Schramm, 555 E. City Line Avenue,
Bala Cynwyd, PA., 19004.

Stephen I. Richman, a
partner in the Washington, Pennsylvania firm of Greenlee, Richman, Derrico & Posa, presented a

Bernard M. Gross was elected
to the Board of Governors of the
Philadelphia Bar Association for
the year 1979. He is a partner in
the firm of Gross & Sklar, P.C.,
Philadelphia.

'60

Ronald Ziegler has
been named Chairman of the
Delivery of Legal Services Committee for the Philadelphia Bar
Association.

'61

Bernard Glassman has
been admitted to partnership in
the firm of Blank, Rome, Comisky
& McCauley, 4 Penn Center Plaza,
Philadelphia 19103.
Wilfred F. Lorry is Chairman
of the Financial Advice Committee
for the Philadelphia Bar Association .

'56

'57
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Hon. Murray S. Eckel!,
former Judge of the Delaware
County Court of Common Pleas,
has been elected President of the
Delaware County Bar Association
for the 1979 year. He is a partner
in the firm of Eckel!, Sparks,
Vadino, Auerbach & Monte in
Delaware County.
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'63
Arnold Machles is Vice
Chairman of the Family Law Section of the Philadelphia Bar Association.
Stephen A. Sheller chairs
the Travel Committee for the
Philadelphia Bar Association.
David C. Toomey is the
Philadelphia Bar Association's
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Chairman of the Committee on
Public Relations.

'64

Francis Moran is Chairman of the joint Committee of
Lawyers and Realtors for the
Philadelphia Bar Association.
Wallace A. Murray, Jr. of
the Norristown, Pennsylvania firm
of Wisler, Pearlstine, Talone,
Craig & Garrity, has been elected
to a three year term as a director
of the Montgomery County Bar
Association.

O'Pake is chairman of a No-Fault
Divorce Reform Bill for the state
of Pennsylvania, subject to hearings this spring.
Jerome J. Verlin has been
elected to the Board of Governors
of the Philadelphia Bar Association.

'68

'65

Harvey Bartle, Ill of the
Philadelphia firm-Dechert, Price
and Rhoads-has been chosen by
Pennsylvania Governor Dick
Thornburgh for the post of Insurance Commissioner, in charge of
regulating the state's multibillion
dollar insurance industry.
David Perry of Rosemont,
Pennsylvania has been appointed
to the new position of staff vice
president of investment planning
for INA Corporation. He is responsible for coordinating investment policy with the corporation's
business objectives, monitoring
investment portfolio performance,
and researching and initiating new
investments in the real estate,
natural resources, and leveraged
leases areas.

Senator Michael A. O'Pake
was honored by the Pennsylvania
District Attorneys Association for
his support and effort on behalf of
securing the passage of the AntiCrime and Corruption legislative
package signed by former Governor Milton Shapp. He has been
named Chairman of the State
judiciary Committee and has been
reappointed to the Governor's
Commission on Crime and Delinquency, formerly the Governor's justice Commission. Senator

Alan R. Markizon has become General Counsel of Filmways, Inc., California. Filmways is
listed on the New York Stock
Exchange and has interests in
insurance, publishing and entertainment.

'66
Roger F. Cox has been
admitted to partnership in the
firm of Blank, Rome, Comisky &
McCauley, 4 Penn Center Plaza,
Philadelphia, 19103.
Charles P. Northrop is to
become vice president, law, of
Consolidated Rail Corporation, a
congressionally sponsored Eastern
freight railroad.
'67

Irene Cotton is the
newly elected Secretary of the
Family Law Section of the Philadelphia Bar Association.
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BrianT. Keirn has been
named senior vice president of
Barber Oil Company, New York,
in charge of corporate administrative and legal affairs. He was
formerly a partner with Ballard,
Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll,
Philadelphia.
John B. Lowy has become
a partner in the firm of Gusrae,
Greene, Kaplan & Lowy with
offices at 67 Wall Street, New
York, 10005 and at 744 Broad
Street, Newark, New jersey 17102.
Arthur E. Schramm, Jr. and
H. Donald Busch, '59, have formed
a firm-Busch & Schramm, 555
East City Line Avenue, Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004-for the general
practice of law.

'70

Marlene F. Lachman is
a newly elected member of the
Philadelphia Bar Association's
Board of Governors. Ms. Lachman
has also become an associate in
the firm of Mesirov, Gelman,
Jaffe, Cramer & jamieson, Fidelity
Building, Philadelphia, 19109, as
of january, 1979.
Steven R. Waxman is Chairman of the Community Legal
Services Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association.

'71
Charles Bloom, Jon G.
Hillsberg, and Lloyd R. Ziff are
instructors at the Evening Division
of the Institute for Paralegal Training in Philadelphia.
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Marc S. Cornblatt has become a member of the firm of
Mesirov, Gelman, Jaffe, Cramer &
Jamieson, Philadelphia, as of January, 1978.

'77

Richard L. Plevinsky has
been admitted to partnership in
the firm of Blank, Rome, Comisky
& McCauley, 4 Penn Center Plaza,
Philadelphia 19103.

Bruce A. Eisenberg and
Edward H. Merves have become
associates of the firm of Blank,
Rome, Comisky & McCauley, 4
Penn Center Plaza, Philadelphia,
19103 as of February, 1979.
Jason Shargel accepted a
position with the Enforcement
Division of the Securities and
Exchange Commission in Washington, D.C.

'73

'78

'72

Sharon M. Zimmer has
become a member of the firm of
Hofheimer, Gartlir, Gottlieb &
Gross, 100 Park Avenue, New
York, 10017.

'7 4

Leonard Cooper is now
associated with the firm of Blum,
Moscovitz, Friedman & Kaplan,
730 Third Avenue, New York,
10017.
Frederica Massiah-Jackson,
of the Philadelphia firm of Blank,
Rome, Comisky & McCauley, was
featured in an article, A Lawyer

Who Cares About Mental Health,
in The Philadelphia Tribune in
February. She has been selected a
finalist for the Philadelphia Jaycees annual Outstanding Young
Leader Award for her involvement
with the area's Mental Health /
Mental Retardation Center.
H. Ronald Klasko has been
appointed to the Board of Directors of the jewish Community Relations Council in Philadelphia.
He 'practices with the firm of
Abrahams and Lowenstein.
Richard N. Weiner is Chairman of the Committee on Bar
Admissions, Placement and Procedures for the Philadelphia Bar
Association.
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Nancy K. Baron-Baer
has become associated with the
firm of Blank, Rome, Comisky &
McCauley, Philadelphia.
Richard A. Friedman has
been selected as one of Chief
justice Warren A. Burger's law
clerks for the 1979 Term of Court.
He is currently clerking for Judge
Harold Leventhal of the D.C.
Circuit.
Faith Halter is clerking for
Judge Richey in Tucson, Arizona.
While at Law School, she participated in the National Wildlife
Federation clinic, where she was
responsible for several projects
that included administrative,
judicial , and legislative work. An
article which she coauthored,
based on her wildlife valuation
research, will be published in the
fall in Ecology Law Quarterly.
Mary C. Helf has become
an associate with the firm of
Mesirov, Gelman, Jaffe, Cramer &
jamieson, Philadelphia.
William j. Murphy has been
selected as Justice Harry Blackmun 's law clerk for the 1979 Term
of Court. He is currently clerking
for judge Seitz of the Third Circuit.
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In Memoriam
'05

Harold S. Shertz, Philadelphia, PA, January
12,1979

'10

Conway W. Dickson, Berwick, PA, November16, 1978
Maxwell Strawbridge, Norristown , PA,
August 20,1978

'15

Murray H. Spahr, Jr., Haverford, PA,
December 25 , 1978

'22

Harold F. Butler, Short Hills, NJ, November
17,1978
Rowland C. Evans, Jr., Pompano Beach , FL,
December 31,1978

'24

PhilipS . Polis, Bala Cynwyd, PA, December
22, 1978

'25

William E. Bushong, Jr., Phoenixville, PA,
November 26, 1978

'29

AlbertS. Herskowitz, Cherry Hill, NJ,
December 12, 1978
Guy E. Waltman, Berkley, Ml, December
26, 1978

'30

Samuel A. Arm strong, Devon , PA, September21 , 1977
Joseph KaplCarlsbad,
an,
CA, December 19,
1978
Edwin J. McDermott, Bryn Mawr, PA,
December 6, 1978

'31

BernardS. Robinson , Philadelphia, PA,
December 23 , 1978
Carlyle M . Tucker, Philadelphia,
,
PA
November 22, 1978

'32

John J. Foulkrod
,
Ill , Gladwyne, PA December30, 1978

'36

Alfred G. Vigderman , Lexington, MA,
November 15,1978
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'38

William E. Hughes, Gloucester City, NJ,
November 27, 1978

'48

Roy S. F. Angle, Waynesboro, PA, December20, 1978

'49

Wesley N. Fach, New York, NY, August,
1978
Martin j. O'Donnell, Freeland, PA, january
6, 1979

'50

Hon. Howard W. Lyon, New Castle, PA,
August 7, 1978

'51

N. Dale Sayre, New York, NY, November 25,
1978

'64

Mrs. Leda Rothman judd, Washington,
D.C., December 20, 1978

'78

Carl Schlein , Metuchen, NJ, October 2,
1978
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Reunions, Etc.
It's that time of year again! Reunions commemorating graduation from Penn Law School are
already in progress so, if you belong to one of the
following classes and have not been contacted and
wish to be, write or call Libby Harwitz at the
Alumni Affairs Office, The University of Pennsylvania Law School , 3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, 19104 or call (215) 243-6321 :
Class
Class
Class
Class
Class
Class
Class

of 1929
of 1932
of 1939
of 1949 (Feb.)
of 1949 (June)
of 1954
of 1959

31

May 18
May 11
April 7

April 28
Pl ans in progress
October, 1979

June 2

50th
47th
40th
30th
30th
25th
20th

Reunion
Reunion
Reunion
Reunion
Reunion
Reunion
Reunion

Have We Heard From You Lately?
We want "all the news that's fit to print"
about you-professionally or in general. The
Journal's Alumni Briefs section is the perfect forum
for keeping in touch with classmates and with other
Alumni. Information as well as your inform al
photographs are welcome. Please use the space
below:
I

Name and Class: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
What's New :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Many classes are holding their reunions here at
The Law School. The environment offers Alumni a
nostalgic return and, in addition, the opportunity to
view the extensive changes in the School's physical
facilities since graduation . The reunions, usually in
the form of dinner-dances, have proven most successful. In any event, the Alumni Office is ready to
assist classes whatever the pleasure.

I

Return to :
The Law Alumni Journal
The University of Pennsylvania Law School
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104

~-----------------------J
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Law Alumni Society
of the University of Pennsylvania
1978-1979
President
First Vice-President
Second Vice-President
Secretary
Treasurer

David H. M arion
Marshall A. Bern stein
joseph G. j . Connolly
Patricia Ann M etzer
G. Craig Lord

Board of Managers

Theodore 0. Rogers
Bernard M. Gross
Doris May Harris
james A. Strazzell a
Richard Bazelon
Sharon Kaplan Wallis
Paul j . Bschorr
Linda A. Fisher
John A. Terrill
Charles I. Cogut
Robert W . Beckman
Howard Gittis
George T. Brubaker
Marlene F. Lachman
Morris M . Shuster

Ex-Officio
Harold Cramer and Patricia Ann Metzer, Cochairmen, Law Alumni Society
Leonard Barkan , Representative of the Law Alumni
Society on the Board of the General Alumni
Society
James 0 . Freedman, Dean , University of Pennsylvania Law School
J. Michael Willmann , Law Alumni Representative
on the Editorial Board of the General Alumni
Society
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